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Hougang By-election Case: What Court 
Decision on By-election Reveals 
 
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee1 
The Singapore Court of Appeal’s judgment in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v 
Attorney-General [2013] SGCA 39 – popularly known as the Hougang by-
election case – shows that the Court sees its role as policing the margins 
rather than involving itself in the heart of politics. The Court held that the 
Government was incorrect in asserting the Constitution confers on it the 
discretion not to hold a by-election at all after a parliamentary seat falls 
vacant. The judgment came as a surprise to those used to a judicial stance 
fairly deferential towards the Government, but on balance the Court did 
accord the Government significant deference as it held that the Prime 
Minister has a fair amount of leeway in deciding when a by-election should be 
conducted. Furthermore, the Court actually found that the application lacked 
standing to bring the case, and was reluctant to set a precedent potentially 
requiring the Government to defend more court cases. 
THE COURT OF APPEAL’S judgment of 5 July in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-
General2 – popularly known as the Hougang by-election case – shows that the Court 
sees its role as policing the margins rather than involving itself in the heart of politics. 
The decision came as a surprise to those used to a judicial stance that is fairly 
deferential towards the Government. It is one of only a handful of cases in which the 
courts have not accepted the Government’s interpretation of the Constitution. 
In this context, deference does not imply any bias in favour of the Government. 
Rather, it suggests it is appropriate for judges to assume that the Government is 
better placed than they are to make certain types of decisions, such as those which 
involve national security or which involve complex policy issues. Courts in various 
Commonwealth jurisdictions have accepted this principle. 
It may be that a court should not be too quick to act deferentially when a 
person asserts that his or her fundamental liberties have been infringed, but that is a 
discussion for another day. 
The applicant Madam Vellama, a Hougang resident, complained of not having 
an MP to assist with her problems when it initially appeared that the Prime Minister 
                                                   
1  LLB (Hons) (Nat’l University of Singapore), LLM (UCL, Lond); PhD (B’ham); Advocate & Solicitor 
(Singapore), Solicitor (England & Wales); Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore 
Management University. 
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might not call a by-election. She did not claim that any of the fundamental liberties 
guaranteed to her by the Constitution had been infringed. 
Rather, the Hougang by-election case centred around the correct 
interpretation of Article 49(1) of the Constitution,3 which states: “Whenever the seat 
of a Member, not being a non-constituency Member, has become vacant for any 
reason other than a dissolution of Parliament [a ‘casual vacancy’], the vacancy shall 
be filled by election in the manner provided by or under any law relating to 
Parliamentary elections for the time being in force.” 
Final arbiter 
Since the 1980s, the Government has asserted that this provision confers on it the 
discretion not to hold a by-election at all after a parliamentary seat falls vacant. The 
Court held that this interpretation was incorrect. 
In reaching this result, the Court reinforced the fact that it alone – and not the 
Government or Parliament – is the final arbiter of the Constitution’s meaning. 
The High Court had held that the phrase “shall be filled by election” meant 
only that a casual vacancy had to be filled by means of an election, not that the 
Government was actually bound to hold a by-election. 
Disagreeing, the Court of Appeal said the phrase meant both that the vacancy 
had to be filled, and it had to be filled through an election. However, it would not be 
necessary to call a by-election if a dissolution of Parliament was imminent. 
The Court emphasised two things. 
First, the rule of law requires all discretionary power to be subject to legal 
limits, which makes it doubtful that the Constitution confers unfettered discretion on 
the Government to decide whether or not to call a by-election. 
Secondly, since an MP is the “voice of his constituents”,4 they would be left 
without proper parliamentary representation if a casual vacancy is left unfilled for an 
unnecessarily long time. 
However, on balance the Court did accord significant deference towards the 
Government. It noted that whether a by-election should be held is “a polycentric 
matter which would involve considerations which go well beyond mere practicality”.5 
For instance, it might be appropriate to delay a poll if the country is hit by 
SARS or haze. 
Therefore, since the matter is so “fact-sensitive”, it will only be in “exceptional 
cases”6 that judges will find that the Government has unreasonably delayed the 
calling of by-elections. The Prime Minister has a fair amount of leeway in making 
such decisions. 
Furthermore, although the Court ruled in Madam Vellama’s favour on the 
substantive issue, it actually dismissed her appeal on the ground that she lacked 
standing to have the case heard. 
By the time the matter came before the Court of Appeal, the Hougang by-
election had already taken place. Thus, she no longer had any personal interest in the 
issue raised. The fact that it might become relevant again in the future was not 
enough to establish that she had sufficient interest in the matter at this time. 
                                                   
3  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint). 
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5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 
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If the applicant possessed standing in the present scenario, the Court 
reasoned, this would lead to the courts being flooded with legal actions brought by 
“mere busybodies and social gadflies, to the detriment of good public 
administration”. 7  Thus, the Court was reluctant to set a precedent potentially 
requiring the Government to defend more court cases, diverting time and resources 
away from the day-to-day governance of the nation. 
Whether a more liberal approach towards standing would indeed have this 
consequence remains an open question. 
In any case, the Court’s ruling on this point makes it harder for applicants to 
raise constitutional issues for the courts’ consideration if the factual basis for the 
issues has dissipated, even though resolving the issues would provide guidance to the 
Government and the public. 
Another case awaiting judgment 
Significantly, the Court stated it was not expressing any view on whether its remarks 
on standing were relevant to “applications founded purely on the breach of public 
duties which do not generate correlative public or private rights”.8 
This seems to point to the case brought late last year by opposition politician 
Kenneth Jeyaretnam, who alleged that the Government had contravened the 
Constitution when it offered a contingent loan of US$4 billion to the International 
Monetary Fund without first seeking the approval of Parliament and the President.9 
Unlike Madam Vellama, Mr Jeyaretnam had at no time asserted that the 
transaction had affected any direct personal right or interest of his. Rather, he had 
brought the case on behalf of all citizens who wished to ensure that the Government 
acts lawfully. 
That matter was heard by the Court of Appeal in April, and we are still 
awaiting its judgment. The Court may possibly decide that Mr Jeyaretnam did have 
standing to bring his case as he did so for different reasons than Madam Vellama. 
A contrary decision will mean that actions of the Government which do not 
directly affect an individual’s personal interests will be incapable of being challenged 
before the courts by ordinary citizens, even though they possibly infringe the 
Constitution. 
Such matters will then have to be resolved in the political rather than the 
judicial arena. If the Hougang by-election judgment is anything to go by, this is 
precisely the Court of Appeal’s view. 
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